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CRIMINAL LAW-PRIVATE EAVESDROPPING-SECOND
CIRCUIT FINDS MARITAL DISPUTE IMPLICITLY
EXEMPTED FROM THE FEDERAL WIRETAPPING
ACT. ANONYMOUS V. ANONYMOUS
When the parties in this case separated in 1972, the father obtained temporary custody of their two children. Sometime after their

divorce in 1974, the mother brought a civil damage action under the
wiretap provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets

Act' in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. She alleged that through the use of an automatic telephone
answering machine installed in his home, her former husband had
surreptitiously intercepted and recorded the telephone calls she had
made to her daughter during the period of separation. According to
her complaint, the answering machine was used even when someone
was at home. Every caller was asked to identify himself and leave a
message, and since a loudspeaker had been attached to the machine,
every caller's voice was broadcast to the household. The father had
instructed the children to answer the phone and record the conversation whenever their mother called.2 His intention, she claimed, was
to use the recordings against her in a later custody battle. Furthermore,
the use of the loudspeaker enabled him to eavesdrop without directly
violating a state court order that had prohibited him "from being in
the same room with the children while they spoke to [their mother]
on the telephone." 3 In his answer, the father stated that he had installed the device to avoid speaking with his wife when she telephoned
the children.
The district court dismissed the complaint. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the facts, as alleged, fail to
"rise to the level of criminal conduct intended to be covered by the
federal wiretap statutes. ' 4 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677

(2d Cir. 1977).
Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, entitled "Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance," after
1.
2.
not the
3.
4.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
Ordinarily, the machine would shut off automatically in 45 seconds whether or
phone was answered.
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 678 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 677.
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extensive hearings had revealed widespread abuse of electronic surveillance techniques by both private and public parties.8 The Act prohibits the interception 6 and disclosure of wire or oral communications,7 except under certain circumstances not relevant to the instant
case.8 Violators are subject to criminal penalties of up to $10,000 or
5. See generally Hearings on the Right to Privacy Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1967) ; Hearings on the Anti-Crime ProgramBefore Subcomm.
No. 5 of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on
Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); Hearings on the Criminal Laws and Procedure Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966); Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 89th Cong., pts. 1-6
(1965-1966); Special Inquiry on Invasion of Privacy Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the House Gov't Operations Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
Hearings on Wiretapping, the Attorney General's Program Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). For a discussion of these legislative hearings
see United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Simpson v. Simpson, 490
F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). See also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 517 n.7 (three proposed bills formed Title III); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (state's electronic
surveillance statute held unconstitutional).
Prior to adoption of Title III, the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (1970), controlled the area of intercepted communications.
6. "Intercept" is defined as "the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or
oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970).
"[E]lectronic, mechnical, or other device" means any device or apparatus
which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication other than(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility,
or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user
by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its
business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary
course of its business ....

Id. § 2510(5).
7. The Act defines "wire" and "oral" communications as follows:
(1) "wire communication" means any communication made in whole or in
part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and
the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common
carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate
or foreign communications;
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.
Id. § 2510(1)-(2).
8. Subdivisions (2) (a) and (2) (b) apply to common carriers and Federal Communications Commission personnel engaged in the normal course of their employment.
Subdivision (2) (c) involves one party consent. See id. § 2511(2). Subdivision 3 applies
to the powers of the President when engaged in matters dealing with the national security. Id. § 2511(3).

19781

ANONYMOUS V. ANONYMOUS

five years imprisonment.9 In addition, any "aggrieved person"' 0 may
bring a civil suit against a violator of the Act.".
Although Congress was concerned primarily with combatting organized crime, 1 2 the Act is not limited solely to this area. Its dual purpose, as stated in the Senate Report, is to protect the privacy of communications and to delineate on a uniform basis the circumstances and
conditions under which the interception of communications may be
authorized. 13 "[T]itle III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers . .. .,14 Thus, it may be concluded that Congress intended the
Act to curb any private electronic surveillance not expressly permitted,l5 and to afford the victims of an unlawful invasion of privacy
9. The Act provides in part as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person
who-(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication;
(d) willfully uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire or
oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information
was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1970).
10. "Aggrieved person" is defined as one "who was a party to any intercepted wire
or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed." Id. §
2510(11).
11.
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against
any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to
intercept, disclose, or use such communications ....
Id. § 2520.
12. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2112. "The major purpose of title III is to combat organized crime." Id. at
70, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 2157.
13. Id. at 66, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2153.
14. Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, Title III prohibits wiretapping by law enforcement officers except under specific circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970).
15. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, 69, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 2154, 2156.
At the hearings, testimony which indicated that Title III prohibits private electronic surveillance included the following:
Hon. Ramsey Clark, Attorney General of the United States: "I think we have
reason to believe and fear that there has been a widespread private use of this sort of
surveillance [wiretapping and bugging], and it should be prohibited in the private sector
as well as the public." Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 288 (1967).
Rep. Robert McClory: "[T]he legislation which I and others have introduced would
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civil recourse for damages. 1 6 Furthermore, the legislative history clearly
reveals Congress' awareness that interspousal wiretaps constituted a major portion of private electronic surveillance.' 7 Witnesses testified that
private bugging in this country is used chiefly in two areas, marital
litigation and commercial espionage.' 8 The need to outlaw all "private
use of electronic surveillance, particularly in domestic relations" was
prevent wiretapping, all private wiretapping except in those cases where it was authorized by court order.... ." Id. at 407.
Rep. Claude Pepper:
Wiretapping and eavesdropping by private individuals presents [sic] a somewhat different problem. Here we have actions that, by any name, are so at
odds with the ideals of this country that they never should have been allowed
to start. As I stated' before, an argument can be made for wiretapping by government officials, but I submit, gentlemen, that no argument, however tenuous,
can be made which would justify the use of wiretapping and eavesdropping
devices or be permitted by private persons.
Id. at 896.
Rep. Edwin D. Eshleman:
All members of the [President's Crime Commission) did agree that private
citizens should be prevented from snooping electronically, and in this proposal
I concur.
The proposal refers only to wiretapping by public law enforcement agencies,
and would not allow private individuals to legally engage in the practice of
wiretapping. I am wholly in agreement that invasion of privacy is repugnant
when used beyond the realm of criminal prosecution.
Id. at 909-10.
16. The remedies were suggested in the Senate Report:
Virtually all concede that the use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance
techniques by private unauthorized hands has little justification where communications are intercepted without the consent of one of the participants....
The prohibition, too, must be enforced with all appropriate sanctions. Criminal
penalties have their part to play. But other remedies must be afforded the
victim of an unlawful invasion of privacy. Provisions must be made for civil
recourse for damages. The perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and criminal proceedings. Each of these objections is
sought by the proposed legislation.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in [196D U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 2156.
17. For instance, Senator Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee, included "divorce
cases" as one of the three major areas of private electronic surveillance. Id. pt. 5, at
2261. See also note 5 supra. See generally Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965-1966).
18. See, e.g., Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1023, 1393 (1967) (statement
by G. Robert Blakey, Prof. of Law, Notre Dame Law School). Professor Blakey stated
that "[t]he use of the electronic surveillance techniques in this country has . . . widely
fallen into the hands of private individuals and [has] been used chiefly in two areas:
Domestic relations investigations and commercial espionage." He expressed fear that
the original bill would not deal with the area of domestic relations investigations. Id. at
1045. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIvACY AND FREEDOM 111 (1967) (noting that a
private detective spends between 40% to 75% of his time on matrimonial cases).
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discussed in the Senate Report.19 It can and ought to be inferred,
therefore, that since Congress was aware of the prevalence of wiretapping in domestic relations, its failure to exclude this area from the
Act's broad prohibitions was deliberate.2 0 Nevertheless, some courts
have persistently argued that since the Act does not specifically include
or exclude the category of "domestic relations," it is not clear that Congress intended the blanket prohibition of Title III to cover inter2
spousal wiretappings. 1
To date, only two circuits have carefully examined the applica2
2
bility of Title III to domestic relations. 2 In Simpson v. Simpson,
the Fifth Circuit reviewed a civil action by a woman against her former
husband who, she alleged, had attached a recording device to the telephone lines at their home, recorded conversations between her and
another man, and later played these tapes to his lawyer, as well as to
his friends and neighbors. Upon examining the Act and its legislative
history,24 the court concluded that Congress did not intend the Act
to control or regulate the use of wiretapping devices within the context of domestic conflicts.2 5 The court rested its holding not on any
specific statutory exemption for domestic conflicts, but instead on two
19. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 225, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
& AD. N.ws 2274 (individual views of Senators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott,
and Thurmond on Titles I, II, and III). As stated in the Senate Report, the problem
with the use of modem and technologically advanced electronic surveillance is the
threat to one's privacy of communications in such areas as "personal, marital, religious,
political, [and] commercial concerns." Id. at 67, reprinted in [1968] U. S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 2154.
20. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Recent Decision, 11
GA. L. REv. 427, 434 (1977); Comment, Interspousal Immunity is Not a Defense in
Criminal Prosecution for Wiretapping, 11 SUFFOLK L. REv. 1367, 1373 (1977); notes
39-43 & accompanying text infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 23-30 & 34-36 infra.
22. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Simpson v. Simpson,
490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
23. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
24. Id. at 806-09.
The court observed from its analysis of the statute, committee reports and legislative hearings the following: (1) Title III is part of the Crime Control Act, (2) the
major purpose of the Act is to combat organized crime, (3) five of Title III's eleven
sections regulate the use of electronic surveillance techniques in criminal activities, and
(4) the hearings focused primarily upon official use of surveillance techniques. The
court did recognize testimony describing the need to control interspousal wiretapping.
It nevertheless indicated that the legislative history was inconclusive in determining
whether Congress desired to include this area within the Act's coverage. Id.
25. Id. at 805. Although noting that Congress, under its authority to control interstate commerce, could have included domestic relations within the Act, id. at 805 n.6,
the court determined that Congress did not intend to overrule the state doctrine of interspousal immunity. Id. at 806 n.7. For a discussion of the doctrine of interspousal
immunity, see text accompanying notes 74-80 infra.
CODE CONG.
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"other considerations." 26 First, it considered what is known as the "extension phone exception," which excludes from the Act's coverage certain devices used in the ordinary course of business. 2 7 Basing its analysis on congressional intent, the court concluded that extension phones
within the family home fall within this exception. 3 It then extended
this "clearly acceptable overhear" to the eavesdropping accomplished
by a wiretap.2 The court's second consideration was that the violator
was subject to criminal sanctions; thus the court felt bound to construe the Act narrowly.30
It is significant that the Fifth Circuit expressed uncertainty in its
interpretation of the statute. It emphasized that its conclusion was limited to the specific facts presented in Simpson:
As should be obvious from the foregoing, we are not without doubts
about our decision. . . .Our decision is, of course, limited to the
specific facts of this case. No public official is involved, nor is any
private person other than appellee, and the locus in quo does not extend beyond the marital home of the parties.8 1
In addition, the court limited the application of its statutory analysis
to cases in which aggrieved spouses were not seeking to recover from
third parties. Noting that relevant passages from the legislative history
were "primarily directed towards the involvement of private investigators in marital conflicts,"8 2 the court reasoned that a "third-party intrusion into the marital home, even if instigated by one spouse, is an offense
26. Id. at 809.
27. 18U.S.C. § 2510(5) (a) (i) (1970). For the full text of the exception, see note
6 supra.
28. See 490 F.2d at 809. In a footnote, the court explained that that interpretation derived from a statement made by Herman Schwartz during one of the legislative
hearings. Id. at 809 n.17. For a discussion of Professor Schwartz's testimony, see note 48
infra.
It is interesting to note the inconsistency in the Simpson court's analysis. The court
first stated that the legislative history was inconclusive in determining whether Congress
intended the Act to cover the area of domestic relations. Then, in the next sentence, on
the basis of one statement made during one of many hearings, it interpreted this
statutory exception as excluding family extension phones. See also Comment, Interspousal
Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U. TOL. L. Rav. 185, 200 (1975) (arguing that
the Simpson court carefully selected among the provisions of Title III for "meaningful"
language).
29. 490 F.2d at 809. In fact, the court went so far as to conclude that this "exemption is indicative of Congress' intention to abjure from deciding a very intimate
question of familial relations, that of the extent of privacy family members may expect
within the home vis-a-vis each other." Id.

30. Id. See generally Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948) ("criminal

law is not to be read expansively to conclude what is not plainly embraced within the
language of the statute").
31. 490 F.2d at 810 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 808.
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against a spouse's privacy of a much greater magnitude than is personal
33
surveillance by the other spouse."
Cases decided shortly thereafter acknowledged that some interspousal electronic surveillance was implicitly exempted from the federal wiretap provisions, but found ways to limit the exemption.34 Several seized upon Simpson's dictum regarding intrusions by third parties;3 others held Simpson inapplicable since the wiretapping occurred
outside of the "marital home. '36 While the latter rationale is justifiable,37 the former seems to have been employed purely to circumvent
Simpson's conclusion that Title III does not apply to interspousal wiretapping. The "intrusion" of third parties in Simpson-the recordings
were played to a lawyer, friends, and neighbors-would appear to be
at least as objectionable as employing an agent to procure the record33. Id. at 809. The court added that personal surveillance by one's spouse "is consistent with whatever expectations of privacy spouses might have vis-a-vis each other
within the marital home." Id. In a footnote it explained that "it is a large jump from a
prohibition on third-party surveillance to one on personal spousal surveillance." Id. at
809 n.15.
34. See, e.g., White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974); Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189
(N.D. Ill. 1975).
In Rickenbacker v. Rickenbacker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976), however,
the court went further:
We do not agree with, the 5th Circuit's patently doubtful conclusion that the
legislative history of the statutes under consideration shows no direct indication
that the statute was intended to reach domestic conflicts. The history of the act
indicates a legislative intent that individuals be protected from invasions of their
privacy by sophisticated surveillance devices.
Id. at 381, 226 S.E.2d at 352. Cf. Markham v. Markham, 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972), aff'd, 272 So. 2d 813 (1973) (relying upon state law, court held evidence
obtained by tapping phone within marital home inadmissible).
35. See Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (plaintiff
prevailed where detective agency and law firms involved in wiretap); cf. White v. Weiss,
535 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976) (successful civil action against private detective agency
which furnished and assisted in installation of telephone wiretapping and recording
equipment); Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (physician, hospital and nurse held civilly liable for monitoring patient's conversations with her attorney). But see Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (C.P. Stark
County Ct. 1974) (Simpson analysis applied to defeat civil action where third party
assisted in the wiretap within the "marital home").
36. See United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974) (where an
unmarried couple was not living together, Simpson held inapplicable because a marital
home never existed). Simpson was similarly distinguished in Rickenbacker v. Rickenbacker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976): "Here, the parties were living in a state
of separation so that the marriage veil which separates the marriage relation from public
concern and scrutiny had been torn asunder. Thus the statutory regulation did not invade the realm of personal acts within a marital home." Id. at 381, 226 S.E.2d at 352.
37. See text accompanying notes 83-88 infra.
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ings. 3s And in either case the primary injury is the intrusion by the
spouse.
The major departure from the Simpson court's interpretation of
Title III occurred in United States v. Jones,3 9 where the Sixth Circuit
reversed a district court's dismissal of an indictment against a husband
who had entered his estranged wife's home and placed a recording device on her phone. These facts alone distinguish Jones from Simpson:
the wiretapping did not occur within the "marital home" and the action was a criminal prosecution.40 The court nevertheless undertook
its own investigation of the Act's legislative history, similar to the one
made in Simpson,41 and concluded "that the Congress enacted Title
III to protect the privacy of all persons conversing over the telephone
and that their privacy is shielded from invasion by third parties and
spouses alike." 42 The court supported its conclusion by noting that the
Act contained no explicit statutory exceptions for interspousal wire43
taps.
In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 4 the Second Circuit adopted the
Fifth Circuit's position that mere marital disputes are implicitly ex38. It might be argued that the involvement of third parties in Simpson did not

occur until after the wiretap was accomplished. But a distinction based on the time
of the third party invasion is meaningless. The same loss of privacy has occurred. See

United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 670 (6th Cir. 1976). See generally Comment,
supra note 28, at 208.
39. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).

40. While an exemption to a statute might normally be construed more broadly
when the statute is used in a criminal rather than a civil case, see note 30 supra, the

state doctrine of interspousal immunity would seem to inhibit the application of Title
III to civil actions by one spouse against another. See text accompanying notes 74-82
infra. Interspousal immunity is not applicable, however, to criminal actions. See note
78 & accompanying text infra.
41. See id. at 667-70. The court noted that although the judiciary does not ordinarily refer to congressional intent if a statute is clear on its face, see, e.g., United States
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961), this analysis was necessary to refute Simpson's
conclusions. See also note 5 & accompanying text supra.
42. 542 F.2d at 670 (emphasis added). This conclusion elinunated the distinction
created by Simpson. As stated in Jones, "it is a classic 'distinction without a difference.'"
Id. The court turned to the definition of "aggrieved person" in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11)
(1970), see 542 F.2d at 670 n.18, as proof that "it makes no difference whether a
wiretap is placed on a telephone by a spouse or by a private detective in the spouse's
employ." Id. at 670. For a definition of "aggrieved person," see note 10 supra.
43. 542 F.2d at 673. The court, however, was reluctant in its conclusion:
[W]e share the concern of other courts which have grappled with this problem
that application of federal wiretap law to essentially domestic conflicts may lead
to harsh results in individual cases. However, the plain language of the section
and the Act's legislative history compels interpretation of the statute to include
interspousal wiretaps. It is not for this Court to question the wisdom of Congress
and to establish an implied exception to a federal statute by judicial fiat. Only
Congress has the authority to amend 18 U.S.C. § 2511.

44. 558 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1977).
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empted from the Act's coverage. 45 It stated that since Anonymous involved a purely domestic conflict, it did not fall within the proscriptions of the federal statute, but should be governed solely by state
law. 46 Although acknowledging that not all spouses are barred from
recovery under Title III, the court remarked that the facts in Anonymous were insufficient to justify such a remedy.4 7 The court also noted
that the father's eavesdropping "would clearly not be prohibited if it
consisted merely of listening into his wife's and daughter's telephone
conversation from an extension phone in his apartment. ' 48 It borrowed
Simpson's argument that to distinguish a case because a device had
been attached to the extension phone would be "a distinction without
'49
a difference.
In order to distinguish the Sixth Circuit's position, the Second
Circuit remarked that in Jones the interception was effected on a telephone other than the defendant's, "thus invad[ing] the privacy of innumerable persons, known and unknown."5 0 Jones, however, did not
rely on this fact as a basis for its holding that marital disputes are not
implicitly exempted from Title III. Moreover, the distinction is inappropriate for two reasons. First, the statute expressly allows any "aggrieved person" to bring a civil cause of action and does not require
multiple invasions of privacy before an individual can sue.51 .The ab45. Id. at 677, 679.
46. Id. at 679.
47. "We do not condone the husband's activity in this case, nor do we suggest that
a plaintiff could never recover damages from his or her spouse under the federal wiretap
statute." Id. The court did not elaborate further.
48. Id. at 678. The court based this conclusion on the testimony of Professor Herman Schwartz before the House Judiciary Committee. Expressing a fear that the original
extension phone exception was too broad, Prof. Schwartz suggested that limiting language be added. Noting that some activities should be exempted, however, he stated:
"Now, we can see in certain situations where [the exception] makes some sense. I take
it nobody wants to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage daughter
or some such related problem." Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm.
No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 950-1022, 989
(1967) (statement of Prof. Herman Schwartz, Prof. of Law, State University of New
York at Buffalo, on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union). For a discussion of
Herman Schwartz's statement, see text accompanying notes 53-67 infra.
49. 558 F.2d at 679.
50. Id. The Second Circuit also distinguished United States v. Schrimsher, 493
F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974). The parties in Schrimsher were not married. Although the
privacy of third parties was invaded, this fact was not the reason for the court's application of Title III. The relevant fact was the absence of a marital home. See also
Rickenbacker v. Rickenbacker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976) (couple living in
a state of separation). Furthermore, invasion of third party privacy should be distinguished from third parties' assistance in the installation of wiretaps. See text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
51. For the statutory definition of "aggrieved person," see note 10 supra. For the
Act's provision concerning who may bring a civil cause of action, see note 11 supra.
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sence of third party injury should not automatically defeat a valid
cause of action. Second, if the courts were concerned solely with the
privacy of third parties, then why permit the spouse to bring the action? The "injured" third party has standing.5 2 And the damage to
the spouse's privacy may be an entirely unsuitable measure of the damage done to others.
To support their position that Title III implicitly exempts marital disputes, both the Second and Fifth Circuits relied on the legislative history of the "extension phone exception." Their interpretation
of that history, however, is highly questionable. The one piece of evidence they offer-a statement made at one of the hearings by Professor Herman Schwartz-is dubious support. Professor Schwartz testified
in opposition to an early version of the bill, in which the exception
was worded broadly:
The term "electronic, mechanical, or other device" does not indude-(1) an extension telephone instrument furnished to the subscriber
or user by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course
53
of its business ....
Professor Schwartz objected to this wording because it appeared to him
to permit "any eavesdropping, whatsoever, if performed by means of
[an] extension telephone."54 He then proceeded to speculate:
Perhaps there is no need or desire to regulate the situation where the
head of the family listens in on a conversation between his teen-age
daughter and her boyfriend, or to find out if someone is using the
phone without authority. Perhaps. But by defining "interception" as
always excluding use of an extension phone [many questionable cases]
aso [sic] are excluded from the regulation. 5
52. See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Light v. United States, 414 U.S. 846 (1973) (holding that section 2510(11), which
defines "aggrieved persons," grants standing to any person who was "a participant in
an intercepted conversation").
53. H.R. 5470, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2515(d)(1) (1967) (submitted by Rep.
C. Pepper), reprinted in Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before the Subcomm.
No. 5 of House Comm. on the judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 892, 894 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
54. House Hearings, supra note 53, at 950, 1014. Professor Schwartz continued: "We are somewhat at a loss to understand why so broad an exclusion is created,
an exclusion which goes beyond all reported decisions and has only one possible precedent in a vague dictum of Mr. Justic [sic] Roberts in the 1942 Goldman case ..
Id. at 1014-15 (citing Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942)).
55. Id. at 1015. Professor Schwartz mentioned the following questionable uses:
(1) an eavesdropper breaks in, hides in one part of a house or office without
the knowledge of anyone else, and listens in on an extension;
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There is no evidence that any member of Congress ever acknowledged that one of the purposes of the extension phone exception was
to allow a father to eavesdrop on his teenage daughter. In fact, the history of Title III suggests precisely the opposite. One year after the
hearings at which Professor Schwartz testified, the omnibus bill containing Title III emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee with
a reworded extension phone exception:
"electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication
other than(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipinient or facility,
or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by
a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course
of its business . .

.56

The committee provided no specific explanation for the new language,
but in discussing the general purposes of the changes it had made, it
stated that Title III, as revised, contained only three exceptions to a

general prohibition of all wiretapping by parties other than duly authorized law enforcement officers; there was no mention of an exemption for marital disputes. 57 Thus, any suggestion that Professor

Schwartz's speculations are indicative of a congressional intent to establish such an exemption is inherently suspect. Moreover, nowhere
(2)
(3)

the police or someone else coerce someone into letting them listen in on an
extension phone;
the police or someone else obtain authority to listen in on an extension
phone by someone not a party to the conversation and who has no authority of any kind to allow them to do so.

rd.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (1970) (emphasis added).
57.
The only exceptions to the above prohibition are: (1) the power of the President to obtain information by such means as he may deem necessary to protect
the Nation from attack or hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain intelligence
information essential to the Nation's security, and to protect the internal security
of the United States from those who advocate its overthrow by force or other
unlawful means; (2) employees of the Federal Communications Commission
may, in the normal course of employment, intercept and disclose wire communications in the discharge of the monitoring responsibilities discharged by the
Commission in the enforcement of chapter 5 of title 47 of the United States
Code; and (3) employees of a communication common carrier may intercept
and disclose wire communications in the normal course of their employment
while engaged in any activity necessary to the rendition of service, or protection
of the right or property of the carrier of such communication.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2153-54.
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is there any indication that the extension phone exception was designed to circumvent privacy rights. As stated so plainly by one court:
"We recognize . . . the importance of extension phones in the tele-

phone communications system .... But we do not believe that a person loses all protection merely because an extension line exists."' 8
Not only is the extension phone exception a shaky foundation for
a judicially created "mere marital disputes" exemption, but, despite
the Second Circuit's suggestions to the contrary, neither should it directly protect the conduct of the father in Anonymous. The reworded
exception, which was eventually passed into law, covers telephone
equipment only if it is "being used" in the ordinary course of business. Although what constitutes use "in the ordinary course of business" has yet to be fully defined, what does not has been made clear.
Courts have refused to extend the exception to equipment used primarily for the purpose of eavesdropping. 9
58. People v. Tebo, 37 Mich. App. 141, 149, 194 N.W.2d 517, 521 (1971).
59. See Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968) (installation of party line by police

not normal use); United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974) (tele-

phone extension used without authorization or consent to record a private telephone
conversation surreptitiously is not used in the ordinary course of business); Gerrard v.
Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (intercepting communications between
patients and their counsel does not fall within one's ordinary course of business) ; United
States v. Banks, 374 F. Supp. 321, 326 (D.S.D. 1974) ("no normal use was ever made
of the [party line] phone" installed by the government at Indian reservation); People
v. Tebo, 37 Mich. App. 141, 149-50, 194 N.W.2d 517, 522 (1971) (policeman surreptiously invading defendant's one permitted telephone call at the station does not fall
within the "ordinary duty contemplated by the statute") ; Rickenbacker v. Rickenbacker,
290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976) (exemption did not apply where extension to
wife's phone hidden in closet and used only for eavesdropping). But cf. United States
v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (not guilty of unlawful interception
of telephone conversations, since the recordings occurred on the department store's privately operated intercommunications system). See also Nova v. Florida, 346 So. 2d 1214
(Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1977); Horn v. State, 298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1974).
As pointed out by Professor James Carr in his recent treatise, the exception "requires that both the installation and use of the excepted instrument be normal." 3. CAaR,
THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, § 3.02[4][a], at 78 (1977) (emphasis added).
Questions of normalcy of installation and use in the ordinary course of the
subscriber's business depend upon the particular facts of each case. Among the
factors which a court could properly consider are: the stated purposes and
circumstances of installation; for whom the installation was made; any discrepancy between stated purpose and actual use; whether there was any apparent
attempt to avoid the requirements of Title III.
Id. at § 3.02[4][a], at 79.
In many cases, courts have applied the extension phone exception unnecessarily,
since one of the parties to the conversation had consented to the eavesdropping. See, e.g.,
People v. Giannopoulos, 20 Ill.
App. 3d 338, 342, 314 N.E.2d 237, 239 (1974); People
v. Brown, 13 Ill.
App. 3d 244, 249, 266 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1970). The consent of one
of the parties to the conversation legitimates the eavesdropping. See text accompanying
notes 63-69 infra.
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In Anonymous, the father claimed that he had installed the answering machine "to avoid speaking to his wife when she telephoned
the children at his apartment." 60 Even if it is assumed that such a purpose would constitute an "ordinary business" use, much of the father's
conduct cannot be justified. According to the complaint, he had listened to and tape recorded his wife's conversations even after his stated
objective-to avoid speaking to her-had been accomplished.0 1 It
would appear then that his interception was not by means of a device "being used" in the ordinary course of his business.
Also, it is perhaps conceivable that it is within a father's business
to eavesdrop upon his children in order to bring them up properly.
Perhaps. But the appellee in Anonymous allegedly used the answering
machine to eavesdrop on the conversations between his daughter and
wife. Since by court order it was not his "ordinary business" to be in
the same room with the children when they spoke to their mother on
the telephone,6 2 he could hardly claim that listening in from another
room was.
In an article written after the passage of the Act, Professor
Schwartz argued that "[t]here is no authority for [the extension telephone exemption], nor is any explanation given for it in the legislative history of Title III. ' 63 He added that the only possible support
for this exclusion is Rathbun v. United States,6 where the Supreme
Court stated that "[e]ach party to a telephone conversation takes the
risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may
66
allow another to overhear the conversation."'6 5 In Lee v. Florida,
however, the Supreme Court limited Rathbun to situations in which
7
one of the parties to the conversation consented to the eavesdropping.
The issue of consent was raised in Anonymous. The father argued
"that he did not violate the statute because his eight year old daughter
60. 558 F.2d at 678.
61. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
62. See note 3 supra.
63. Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: Politics of "Law
and Order:"67 MIcH. L. REv. 455, 494 (1968).
64. 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
65. Id. at 111.

66. 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
67. Id. at 381 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346,

349 (10th Cir. 1974).
The consent defense, section 2511(2) (d), reads in part: "It shall not be unlawful
under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral
communication . . . where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (1970).
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consented to his interception of her telephone conversation with her
mother," and that if she "lacked the capacity to consent, then he, as
her lawful guardian, consented for her." 68 The Second Circuit did not
reach this issue,69 but in any event the father's argument is unconvincing since it is inconsistent with the spirit of the state court order,
namely, that neither he nor his daughter could lawfully consent to his
eavesdropping on conversations between his wife and the children.
Finally, the device actually used by the father in Anonymous was
neither furnished nor installed by a communications common carrier.70
Nor was it an extension phone. Although an automatic answering machine would appear to come within the terms of the exception,7 1 it is
not clear that such a reading was intended by Congress,12 since an answering machine presents a greater threat to privacy than an extension
phone. An answering machine allows its user to obtain permanent recordings and to hear conversations even if he is not at home at the
time of the call. Also, since picking up an extension phone can often
be detected by a party on the line, the use of an answering machine
with an attached loudspeaker makes eavesdropping less likely to be
noticed. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit stated in Anonymous that
to distinguish between extension phones and answering machines
would be "a distinction without a difference." 73
68. 558 F.2d at 679-80.

69. Id.

70. "The mode of interception was as follows: appellee had purchased at a local
retail store one of the newly popular automatic telephone answering machines, and had
plugged it into the standard Telephone Company jack in his apartment." 558 F.2d at
678.
71. See note 6 supra.

72. See United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974). In that case, the
Tenth Circuit said it is immaterial whether a tape recorder connected to a telephone
receiver or the receiver itself is labeled the intercepting device. "IT]he recording of a
conversation is immaterial when the overhearing is itself illegal. It is the means whereby
the contents of the conversation are acquired that is crucial. A recording device placed
next to, or connected with, a telephone receiver . . .is a mere accessory designed to
preserve the contents of the communication." Id. at 350 (citation omitted). The court
in Anonymous, however, distinguished Harpel:

The facts in this case are nothing like those in United States v. Harpel, 493
F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974), where the court held that a policeman's interception
of a fellow officer's conversation was not "in the ordinary course of business".
To the extent that the Harpel court held more broadly that no use of an
extension phone without consent would be "in the ordinary course of business",
we disagree. Such an interpretation would render the extension phone exemption meaningless, since interceptions which have the consent of one of the
parties to the conversation are explicitly exempted from coverage by the Act
in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (c)and (d).
558 F.2d at 679 n.5.
73. Id. at 679. But see Kendrick v. State, 123 Ga. App. 785, 182 S.E.2d 525
(1971). In this interspousal wiretapping case, the court stated "that the act of listening
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There is another consideration that may have influenced the
Anonymous decision: the doctrine of interspousal immunity. 74 This
common law doctrine, recognized in some form by thirty states but
abrogated by twenty, prevents a person from suing his or her spouse.75
76
Although the doctrine has been recognized in civil actions in torts,
it is generally not applied to intentional torts77 or criminal actions. 78

The underlying policy reasons are the preservation of marital unity
and the prevention of collusive suits between husband and wife.79 But
as Professor James G. Carr has stated:
when one spouse attempts to recover against the other for wiretapping or bugging, the surveillance and its discovery have probably done
far more harm to marital unity than could be caused by a lawsuit.
The danger of collusive litigation appears equally slight. To rely on
the concept of interspousal immunity to dismiss § 2520 complaints disregards the danger that "the most potent invader of privacy can be
used .. .in the most private of all human relationships" without redress.8

0

In Anonymous, the Second Circuit did not expressly discuss interspousal immunity; it simply argued that since the purpose of the
to a telephone receiver is different from recording the conversation by means of a tape
recorder."
74. In Simpson, the Fifth Circuit argued that Title III would conflict with interspousal immunity when applied to matrimonial actions, and concluded that Congress
had not intended to abrogate the doctrine. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d at 806 n.7;
note 23 supra. In Jones, however, the Sixth Circuit perceived a legitimate congressional
desire to provide a federal remedy since "state law is far from uniform on the doctrine
of interspousal immunity." United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 672. The court pointed
out that many states have abandoned the doctrine, doubted if a state law doctrine could
prevent the application of a statutory federal cause of action, and noted that the doctrine does not apply to criminal prosecutions. Id. See also Remington v. Remington, 393
F. Supp. 898, 902 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Pennsylvania doctrine of interspousal immunity
should not prevent application of the federal wiretap provisions).
New York State has completely abolished interspousal immunity in tort actions. See
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 133 (McKinney 1978).
75. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 772, n.21; Comment, supra note 28,
at 190 n.27. As noted in Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Pa.
1974), under Pennsylvania law the exceptions include divorce proceedings or suits to
protect one's separate property. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 122, at 863-64
(4th ed. 1971).
76. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 672. See generally H. CLARK, LAW
OF DomEs-Tic RELATIONS § 9.1, at 252-56 (1968); McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts
Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 303-07 (1959); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations,43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1031-35 (1930).
77. See Comment, supra note 28, at 196. For a list of cases applying the doctrine,
see id. at 191-97.
78. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 672.
79. Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also
Comment, supra note 28, at 193-95; Comment, supra note 20, at 1369 n.22.
80. J. CARR, supra note 59, § 3.05[4][b][iii] (quoting Comment, supra note 28,
at 212).
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wiretapping was to obtain evidence for a custody suit, the state law
governing matrimonial cases should apply."' This is somewhat curious,
however, because where the cause of action is based upon a federal
statute, the matrimonial nature of the case should not deny the aggrieved person the federal remedy.8 2 The impact of a broad classifica81. 558 F.2d at 679. The court did not exclude all matrimonial disputes from the
federal act; it merely failed to indicate how this determination should be made.
For cases applying New York law to wiretaps placed within the family home, see
Connin v. Connin, 89 Misc. 2d 548, 392 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1976) (state penal law clearly
prohibited husband from tapping phone in marital residence); Plotkin v. Rabinowitz, 54
Misc. 2d 550, 283 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1967) (evidence obtained by son from tape recording
his mother's telephone conversations held inadmissible). Prior to Plotkin, the controlling
case in this area was People v. Appelbaum, 277 A.D. 43, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, aff'd, 301
N.Y. 738, 95 N.E.2d 410 (1950). In Appelbaum, the court took a different approach:
[T]here is a condition implied that the telephone will not be used to the detriment of the subscriber's business, household or marital status. . . . To this end
he [the subscriber] may have his own line tapped or otherwise checked so that
his business may not be damaged, his household relations impaired or his marital
status disrupted. When a subscriber exercises this paramount right, the one
using the line subject to the implied conditions stated, is using it with the presumed understanding that his otherwise inviolate right of privacy to that extent
may be invaded.
Id. at 44, 97 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10, overruled, Plotkin v. Rabinowitz, 54 Misc. 2d 550,
283 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1967).
For other jurisdictions applying state law to interspousal wiretapping, see Beaber
v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (C.P. Stark County Ct. 1974) (relying
upon state law and Simpson, court held evidence obtained by husband tapping phone
within marital home admissible); White v. Longo, 190 Neb. 703, 212 N.W.2d 84
(1973) (wife tapped marital phone to record conversations between husband and lover);
Markham v. Markham, 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1972) (tapes obtained by
husband from tapping marital phone were not admissible since there was no special
right which permits a husband to invade the privacy of his wife). See also Kendrick v.
State, 123 Ga. App. 785, 182 S.E.2d 525 (1971) (two private detectives, employed by
wife to place a tap on husband's telephone, held criminally liable). In Rickenbacker v.
Rickenbacker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976), however, the state court applied
the federal act in declaring inadmissible at trial evidence obtained by husband through
interception of wife's phone calls. The court distinguished Simpson since here "the
parties were living in a state of separation so that . . . the statutory regulation did
not invade the realm of personal acts within a marital home." Id. at 381, 226 S.E.2d
at 352.
82. For example, the Second Circuit has previously upheld federal diversity jurisdiction over matrimonial cases. See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 812 (E.D.N.Y.
1968) ("[a] federal court is not deprived of competence merely because the parties involved are husband and wife and the controversy might be termed a 'marital dispute' ").
Cf. Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosensteil, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973)
(federal jurisdiction was allowed in a diversity case involving legal fees from matrimonial
litigation).
For Second Circuit cases which have recognized jurisdiction over cases involving
some aspect of marital status, see, e.g., Holm v. Shilensky, 388 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1968)
(fraud in inducing divorced wife to agree to property settlement incorporated into divorce
decree); Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1962) (action to invalidate divorce decree on ground decree was entered unconstitutionally); Cohen v. Randall, 137
F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 796 (1943) (diversity action to recover
damages for alleged fraudulent representations made by former spouse which induced
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tion of "mere marital disputes" would effectively deny many aggrieved
spouses remedies to which they should be entitled under the Act.
While the Second Circuit in Anonymous v. Anonymous purports
to have adopted the Fifth Circuit's position in Simpson, it has actually
extended the holding of that case far beyond its specific facts. Simpson
involved a "mere marital dispute" because the locus in quo of the wiretap was within the marital home. This requirement, carefully emphasized by the Simpson court in a closing caveat,8 3 is absent in Anonymous, where the parties were living apart, preparing for a divorce, and
under a state court order prohibiting the appellee from overhearing
his wife's telephone conversations to her children.8a The Second Circuit ignored Jones,8 5 as well as the many lower court decisions that
held Simpson inapplicable to cases in which the parties were living
86
separately at the time of the surveillance.
An exemption for marital disputes is suggested neither by the
wording nor the legislative history of Title 111.87 If the courts intend
plaintiff to enter into a separation agreement and obtain a divorce). See generally 6A
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 57.21[2], at 57-222 to -224 (2d ed. 1974).
Also, the Supreme Court has sustained federal jurisdiction to enforce a state court

alimony award rendered in a sister state. See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582,
591 (1859) (holding that the equity courts of the United States, as well as the equity
courts of the states, have jurisdiction to order a sister state to carry into judgment an
alimony decree given final and binding force in the state where it was originally given);
accord, Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1910) (under the full faith and credit

clause, a federal court has jurisdiction over past due installments of a judgment for

future alimony unless such a decree is discretionary). As noted in Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1974), if civil damages were available only
when law enforcement agents of public officials violated the statute, Congress would
have imposed explicit restrictions.
83. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
84. See text accompayning note 3 supra.
85. The only significant difference between Anonymous and Jones is that in
Anonymous the husband was tapping his own phone rather than his wife's. The Jones
court, however, opined that the location of the surveillance should have no "relevance
in ascertaining the scope of the statute." 542 F.2d at 673. See also White v. Longo, 190
Neb. 703, 212 N.W.2d 84 (1973). "The fact that the [spouse] tapped her own telephone
is immaterial as she was not a party to the communication and it is the parties to the
communications who are protected by the statute." Id. at 709-10, 212 N.W.2d at 88.
86. See notes 34-37 & accompanying text supra.
87. "Courts which allow one spouse to eavesdrop electronically on the other
misread and misapply the legislative history of Title III. These courts rely on the fact
that congressional debates emphasized surveillance by law enforcement officers, with
only passing reference to third-party eavesdropping or activities within the home."
J. CARR, supra note 59, § 3.05[4][b][iii], at 100.
Relatively little congressional attention was directed towards the need to
control private electronic surveillance because the issue presented no controversy.
To equate that relative silence on the topic of interspousal eavesdropping with
acceptance of the practice is to misinterpret the legislative history. Law enforcement use of surveillance received more attention because it was and is far more
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to carve such an exemption they should at the very least define it narrowly. As stated in Jones, the court should inquire into whether "the
marriage . . . [has] become one in name more than fact."88 After all,
what do the words "marital home" mean when applied to parties
who are separated and contemplating divorce, especially since at this
stage -the purpose of the intereption is to enable one spouse to
obtain damaging information against the other?
ROSLYN A. LIPTON
volatile. Unlike law enforcement surveillance, however, no witness at congressional hearings on Title III spoke in favor of private nonconsensual eavesdropping.
Id. at 101. "By establishing an ad hoc exception on the basis of [misinterpreting) the
legislative history . . . , courts which allow secret surveillance in the home disregard the
fundamental intent of Title III's author [see note 17 supra] and Congress to prohibit
all interception except as specifically provided by statute." Id. at 101.
88. Id. The Sixth Circuit doubted in Jones whether that case involved a
"'marital home' within the Simpson Court's meaning of the term." 542 F.2d at 673.
See Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also Recent
Decision, supra note 19, at 435-36.

